Advisory · Exploited · CVE-2026-94504 and CVE-2026-93836

Ninja Forms and WPC Product Bundles XSS: the hidden-admin campaign

Patchstack described on 6 October 2026 a campaign that submits a script through two unauthenticated stored XSS flaws, one in Ninja Forms 3.15.3 and earlier and one in WPC Product Bundles for WooCommerce. When an administrator opens the stored entry, the script uses that session to install a fake plugin, create an administrator the Users screen does not show, and leave login tokens behind. Both plugins were already fixed; updating stops new injections and removes none of what was planted.

First published in the weekly briefing of 12 October 2026 and moved here unchanged, so the indicators and the cleanup order have a page of their own.

Affected
Ninja Forms 3.15.3 and earlier; WPC Product Bundles for WooCommerce before 8.6.7
Fixed in
Ninja Forms 3.15.4 (21 September) and WPC Product Bundles 8.6.7 (19 September)
Exploited
From 4 October 2026, per Patchstack; the script loads from imgcdn1.com
Leaves behind
The fake “WP Smart Thumbnails” plugin, two must-use plugins, a hidden administrator and login tokens

Exploited · CVE-2026-94504 and CVE-2026-93836

Ninja Forms and WPC Product Bundles: one XSS, four ways back in

Patchstack published details on 6 October of a campaign that uses two unauthenticated stored cross-site scripting flaws. CVE-2026-94504 is in Ninja Forms 3.15.3 and earlier, which has more than 500,000 active installs: a value submitted anonymously through a paragraph text field is shown without proper escaping in the legacy submission editor. CVE-2026-93836 is in WPC Product Bundles for WooCommerce 8.6.6 and earlier, which has more than 30,000 installs: a bundle quantity such as 1 followed by HTML is stored as-is in the order item metadata. In both cases the attacker needs no account. The script runs when an administrator opens the submission or the order.

Both flaws were disclosed on 22 September, and both were already fixed: WPC Product Bundles in 8.6.7 on 19 September, and Ninja Forms in 3.15.4 on 21 September. The attacker’s domain, imgcdn1.com, was registered on 1 October. Patchstack saw the first exploitation request against WPC Product Bundles at 10:39 UTC on 4 October, and the same payload arriving through Ninja Forms on 5 October. It describes the volume as limited so far and expects the number of vulnerabilities used to deliver the payload to grow: “Two is what we have confirmed, not what we expect the final count to be.” Patchstack scores both flaws 7.1; the CVE records, scored by Wordfence, give 7.2. Neither is on CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

The injected tag loads https://imgcdn1.com/fz/x.js into the administrator’s browser. The script does not steal the login cookie. It uses the administrator’s open session to install a plugin called “WP Smart Thumbnails” 1.2.4, by a made-up author named MediaPress Labs, through WordPress’s own installer. It then creates an administrator with credentials supplied by the attacker’s server, and runs a second-stage file, emer-run.php, which sets up the persistence. The files it drops take the timestamp of the oldest file in the WordPress root, so sorting by modification date will not bring them to the top.

Figure 1 · At a glance

One stored script, opened by an administrator, leaves four ways back in.

QuestionAnswer
EntryUnauthenticated stored XSS in Ninja Forms ≤ 3.15.3 and WPC Product Bundles before 8.6.7
Fixed inNinja Forms 3.15.4 and WPC Product Bundles 8.6.7
TriggerAn administrator opens the stored entry; the script loads from imgcdn1.com
Leaves behindFake “WP Smart Thumbnails” plugin, two must-use plugins, a hidden administrator, login tokens
UpdatingStops new injections; removes none of the above
The points that decide what to do about the Ninja Forms and WPC Product Bundles stored XSS campaign, as stated in the sections below.
  • A visible administrator, created through the normal Add User screen. The only one of the four that a site owner sees in the dashboard.
  • A hidden administrator, kept out of the Users screen by a must-use plugin. Its username is picked from about fifty operational-sounding words such as support, updater, maintenance, or backup; its email address is at wordpress.org; its password is 16 random characters.
  • A magic login link, /wp-login.php?_wplogin= followed by a token, that logs in as the site’s oldest existing administrator, not as the hidden one.
  • A file manager inside the fake plugin, with no authentication of any kind, reachable by a direct request.

Exploited · what to check

How to tell whether the campaign reached your site, and how to clean it

Run these checks on every site that was still on a vulnerable version on or after 1 October, when the attacker’s domain was registered, including sites that are already updated. If you do not know when a site was updated, check it anyway. The indicators below come from Patchstack’s analysis.

IndicatorWhere to lookWhat it means
imgcdn1.com, /fz/x.js, or /fz/c.phpNinja Forms submissions, WooCommerce order item meta (_woosb_ids), access and proxy logsThe injected script is stored on the site, or a browser fetched it
wp-content/plugins/wp-smart-thumbnails/, with wp-smart-thumbnails.php and emer-run.phpFile system and the Plugins screenThe fake plugin: a packed dropper with a built-in file manager, and the persistence installer
class-wp-query-xxxxxxxx.php (eight hex characters) and class-wp-token-validate.phpwp-content/mu-pluginsThe must-use plugins that hide the extra administrator and issue login tokens. They are obfuscated with a per-site key, so there is no fixed hash to match
Options fz_emer_done_v1 and fz_emer_login_tokensThe wp_options tableThe persistence stage ran on this site
Requests to wp-login.php with a _wplogin parameterAccess logsSomeone used the magic login link
An administrator in wp_users that the Users screen does not list, often with an @wordpress.org emailThe database, queried directlyThe hidden administrator

Exploited · cleanup

Cleaning up after the campaign: every layer in one pass

Patchstack’s recommended order, condensed. The point of doing it in one pass is that each layer the attacker left can rebuild the others.

  1. 01

    Update both plugins to the current release

    Ninja Forms 3.15.5, which also fixes a related stored XSS in rich-text paragraph fields (CVE-2026-90438), and WPC Product Bundles 8.7.5, which includes the further bundle-data hardening added in 8.7.3. If a site cannot be updated today, deactivate the plugin until it can.

  2. 02

    Look for the implants before removing anything

    Search for the indicators above and preserve copies of anything you find. Compare the administrators in the database with those the dashboard shows. Check the files in mu-plugins by content, not by date: their timestamps were forged.

  3. 03

    Remove every layer in one pass

    Delete the unauthorised accounts, the fake plugin, the must-use plugins, and both options. If you remove them one at a time, whatever is left can recreate the rest.

  4. 04

    Rotate credentials and salts

    Change every administrator password, starting with the oldest administrator account, which the magic link logs in as. Then replace the authentication keys and salts in wp-config.php so that existing sessions end.

  5. 05

    Review what happened in between

    Look for other changes to files and the database around the time an administrator opened form submissions or WooCommerce orders. Blocking the source IPs Patchstack lists is not a lasting fix: four of the five were Tor exit nodes.

Common questions

Common questions about the hidden-administrator campaign

I updated Ninja Forms and WPC Product Bundles. Am I safe?

Safe from new injections, yes. Not necessarily clean. If either plugin was installed and out of date when the attacks began on 4 October, check for the wp-smart-thumbnails plugin, files in wp-content/mu-plugins, the options fz_emer_done_v1 and fz_emer_login_tokens, and administrators in the database that the Users screen does not list. The update removes none of them.

Why can’t I see the extra administrator in the dashboard?

Because one of the must-use plugins the attacker installs filters it out of the Users screen, and the same filter can hide it from other tools that run through WordPress. Query the database directly — the wp_users table, joined to the wp_capabilities rows in wp_usermeta — and compare the administrators it lists with the ones the dashboard shows. An administrator with an @wordpress.org email address and a generic name such as support or updater is a strong sign.

Does the attacker need an account on my site?

No. Both flaws accept the malicious input from anyone: a Ninja Forms submission or a WooCommerce order. The attack runs when an administrator later opens that submission or order in the dashboard, using the administrator’s own session.

Choose the response path

An indicator from this campaign is on the site: choose the response path.

One site, one worrying result

Get the finding classified and the site restored to a trusted state.

Best when the checks turned up a hidden administrator, the wp-smart-thumbnails plugin, unexplained mu-plugins, or a _wplogin request, and you want every layer removed in one pass rather than one at a time.

The server under the sites

Check that the patches are actually in effect.

Best when you run your own Apache or nginx, OpenSSL and PHP updates need confirming across several servers, or CloudLinux kernels are still waiting for a reboot.