Advisory · PHP · PHP2Shell

PHP2Shell after the patch: exploitation, proof of fix, CVE-2026-115560

The alert of 21 October covers the two PHP core flaws themselves, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, and the releases that fix them. This page follows what happened next: a first exploitation attempt on 17 October, four days before disclosure; millions of blocked requests in the week after; confirmed exploitation in the wild and a chain with a kernel flaw that ends in root. It also covers the part of the patching that fails quietly, because a backported PHP package keeps the old version number, and the second advisory, CVE-2026-115560, which had no fixed release until PHP 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37 and 8.2.36 on 19 November.

This page collects the PHP2Shell follow-ups from the weekly briefings of 26 October, 2 November and 9 November 2026, oldest first. Each section is dated; the newest is the current status.

Fixed in
PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 (21 October 2026); vendor backports for older branches
Exploitation
First attempt seen 17 October; in CISA’s KEV since 26 October; chained with Fragnesia, CVE-2026-46300, to root
Proving the fix
The package changelog and the running process, not php -v: backports keep the lower version string
Fixed since
CVE-2026-115560 is fixed in PHP 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37 and 8.2.36 (19 November 2026); the dated sections below predate that

26 October · PHP runtime · CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619

PHP2Shell: patch the server before the application, and look back to 17 October

Wednesday’s alert covered the flaws themselves: two unauthenticated remote code execution bugs in PHP core, one reached through out-of-memory handling and one through request state that outlives its memory, fixed in PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 at 14:00 UTC on 21 October. PHP’s position has not changed: every installation that serves web requests is at risk, PHP-FPM, mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed alike, there are no complete mitigations, and updating is the only safe choice. WordPress.org said the same on 21 October: no WordPress update is required or planned, the fix is PHP’s, and the version WordPress runs on is at Tools, Site Health, Info, Server.

What is new is the timeline. Amazon Threat Intelligence published on 23 October what its MadPot honeypots saw: a single exploitation attempt on 17 October from an address tied to a commercial anonymisation network, four days before disclosure and with no explanation of how the actor had the details; several proof-of-concept exploits appearing from about 02:00 UTC on 21 October; more attempts from further anonymised infrastructure between 02:00 and 08:00 UTC with varying payloads, which Amazon reads as several actors; and after the 14:00 UTC release, new exploits within hours and attempts against the sensors almost immediately, which it calls broad exploitation in the wild. Amazon is careful on one point: it has not confirmed that any attempt would have succeeded on a real system. Its advice follows from the dates anyway: start any investigation from 17 October, search form-upload POST requests for the string PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS, and treat the six addresses it lists as leads to investigate rather than a block list, because they include shared anonymisation infrastructure.

On cPanel, every supported version is affected, and the fix arrived in cPanel & WHM 11.110.0.153, 11.134.0.66, 11.136.0.50, 11.138.0.18 and WP Squared 11.138.1.17, with EasyApache 4 25.91 on 21 October carrying the rebuilt packages: ea-php82 to ea-php85 at the upstream versions, and ea-php74, ea-php80 and ea-php81 as backports at 7.4.33-19, 8.0.30-12 and 8.1.34-5. 25.92 the same day only rebuilds the meta packages so their changelogs list the CVEs. CloudLinux has its own ea-php builds from ea-php52 to ea-php85 and alt-php packages for 5.2 to 8.5 on CloudLinux 7, 8, 9 and Ubuntu 22.04; on CloudLinux 10 only alt-php 5.2 is in the stable repository and the rest come through the TuxCare extended-lifecycle repository. For anything older than 7.4 on cPanel itself, cPanel points to TuxCare ELS for PHP.

The backports keep the lower version string. CloudLinux’s own example is a fixed ea-php84 reporting 8.4.26-2 rather than 8.4.27, and the cPanel-built ea-php74 reports 7.4.33 with a package release number that has moved. So php -v cannot tell you whether a server is fixed, in either direction. The package changelog can:

shell
rpm -q --changelog ea-php81-php-cli | grep -m1 -E 'CVE-2026-(109618|109619)'
rpm -q --changelog alt-php85-common | grep -E 'CVE-2026-(109618|109619)'
zgrep -E 'CVE-2026-109618' /usr/share/doc/ea-php81-php-cli/changelog.Debian.gz

Run it for every ea-php and alt-php branch that any site selects, not just the server default. Imunify360’s ruleset 8.88 adds rule 77049357, which blocks a serialised PHP object in the upload-progress field regardless of the Referer header; CloudLinux calls it a virtual patch that stops known request patterns at the edge while the vulnerable code stays as it is, says no rule yet covers the out-of-memory path of CVE-2026-109618, and that crafted requests resembling normal uploads may get through. It helps while the packages install. It is not a reason to delay them.

Figure 1 · At a glance

Patched on paper is not patched: the version string does not move on a backport.

QuestionAnswer
Fixed releasesPHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35, 21 October 2026
First attempt seen17 October, four days before disclosure (Amazon MadPot)
StatusIn CISA’s KEV since 26 October; chained with Fragnesia to root
How to prove the fixThe package changelog per ea-php and alt-php branch, not php -v
Fixed sinceCVE-2026-115560: PHP 8.5.13, 8.4.28, 8.3.37 and 8.2.36, 19 November
The points that decide what to do about PHP2Shell, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, after the patch, as stated in the sections below.

2 November · PHP · PHP2Shell, CVE-2026-115560 and the Updraft leftovers

PHP2Shell two weeks on: nine million rule matches, and a second advisory still without a fix

Imunify360 published its fleet numbers for the week after PHP2Shell: close to 3 million attack requests against roughly 100,000 servers and 1.7 million sites, a peak on 24 October of 1.3 million attempts in a day with 99.0 percent blocked, and about 9 million matches on the dedicated PHP2Shell rules between 21 and 26 October, of which about 6.25 million were from blocking rules and the rest from logging ones. No sign of a successful compromise on the fleet, by its account. Two caveats from its own write-up: the blocking rules cover the upload-progress path, which is CVE-2026-109619, while the out-of-memory path of CVE-2026-109618 has logging rules only; and the rules are a virtual patch that stops known request shapes at the edge while the vulnerable interpreter stays as it is. Nine million matches in six days is the argument for checking what is actually running rather than what the repository says.

The things that stay unpatched after a fleet update are the ones outside the update path: a PHP built from source years ago for one application, an alt-php or ea-php branch no domain officially selects but a .htaccess handler still points at, a CageFS skeleton that was not refreshed, a PHP-FPM pool that was never restarted after the packages changed, and a ModSecurity or Imunify rule that was disabled for one domain during an incident and never re-enabled. Each is a one-line check:

shell
/usr/local/cpanel/bin/rebuild_phpconf --current
for p in /opt/cpanel/ea-php*/root/usr/bin/php /opt/alt/php*/usr/bin/php; do echo "$p $($p -r "echo PHP_VERSION;")"; done
rpm -q --changelog ea-php81-php-cli | grep -m1 -E "CVE-2026-(109618|109619)"
grep -rl "ea-php\|alt-php" /home/*/public_html/.htaccess 2>/dev/null | head
imunify360-agent config show | grep -iA3 "MOD_SEC"

PHP’s informational advisory of 23 October for CVE-2026-115560, the second session-upload-progress issue, still has no fixed release as of 2 November; PHP’s archive shows only the 26 October Windows rebuilds for Brotli since. The mitigation stands: session.upload_progress.enabled set to 0, on every SAPI and every branch, with the workers restarted. Because php.ini, a .user.ini, a PHP-FPM pool file and a per-domain MultiPHP setting can each override the others, read the effective value from the interpreter rather than the file:

shell
for p in /opt/cpanel/ea-php*/root/usr/bin/php /opt/alt/php*/usr/bin/php; do echo "$p $($p -r "echo ini_get('session.upload_progress.enabled');")"; done
grep -rs "upload_progress" /home/*/public_html/.user.ini /opt/cpanel/ea-php*/root/etc/php-fpm.d/*.conf

9 November · PHP · PHP2Shell and CVE-2026-115560

PHP2Shell three weeks on: confirmed in the wild, chained to root, and nothing new from PHP

The PHP side has not changed since last week. PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 from 21 October remain the fixed releases for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, both in CISA’s catalog since 26 October. The best public evidence of successful exploitation is still the honeypot data reported by BleepingComputer on 26 October: confirmed code execution with usable memory disclosure against Apache with mod_php running PHP 8.4.26, which is the configuration PHP itself rates highest risk. What is new is the Fragnesia chain above, which turns the question “is PHP patched” into “is PHP patched and is the kernel patched”.

CVE-2026-115560, the session upload progress issue PHP described on 23 October, still has no fixed release, and PHP says the full advisory will come with the next regular release. Keep session.upload_progress.enabled at 0, set where it applies before request parsing, which PHP specifies as php.ini, the FPM pool or the server configuration, and not .user.ini or ini_set(). Two dates to plan around: PHP 8.6.0 is due for general availability on 19 November, and PHP 8.2 reaches end of life on 31 December, after which the PHP project ships no fixes for it.

shell
for p in /opt/cpanel/ea-php*/root/usr/bin/php /opt/alt/php*/usr/bin/php /usr/bin/php; do [ -x "$p" ] && echo "$p $($p -r "echo PHP_VERSION, \" upload_progress=\", ini_get(\"session.upload_progress.enabled\");")"; done

Common questions

Common questions about PHP2Shell after the patch

I updated WordPress and all plugins. Am I protected from PHP2Shell?

No. The flaws are in PHP, the interpreter under WordPress, and nothing inside WordPress changes it. The server needs the fixed PHP packages on every branch any site uses, followed by a restart of Apache or PHP-FPM. On shared hosting, ask the provider which branches they updated and when, and read the PHP version at Tools, Site Health, Info, Server; a backported package keeps the old number, so ask for the changelog rather than the version.

My server was patched on 22 October. Do I still need to look at logs?

Yes, from 17 October. Amazon saw an exploitation attempt that day and broad attempts from the morning of 21 October, before the release. Search multipart POST requests for PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS, look for worker crashes, and check for new files, cron entries, administrators and outbound connections in that window. Amazon has not confirmed a successful compromise; only your own evidence can rule one out for your server.

Is the PHP2Shell patching finished?

On servers where the packages were updated, the workers restarted, and the package changelog on every branch any site uses shows the two CVE identifiers, yes for CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. The separate CVE-2026-115560 still has no fixed release, so session.upload_progress.enabled stays at 0 on every SAPI. Imunify’s nine million rule matches in six days are the reason to check interpreters installed outside the package manager, CageFS skeletons and per-domain handlers rather than trusting the repository state.

My PHP is patched. Do I still need the kernel update?

Yes. PHP2Shell is one way to get a shell as the web user; a vulnerable plugin is another, and there are many. The kernel fix is what stops that shell becoming root. Check that the running kernel, not just an installed one, carries the CVE-2026-46300 fix.

Choose the response path

PHP is patched and the look-back is still to do: choose the response path.

The server under the sites

Get both halves of the PHP2Shell chain checked and proven on every host.

Best when several servers need PHP and the kernel verified from the running process rather than the repository, the Core update window and the published addresses searched in the logs, and the post-exploitation look-back done once, with a written result per host.

One site, one worrying result

Get the finding classified and the site restored to a trusted state.

Best when an exploited booking, membership or form plugin left an administrator or a PHP file behind, a plugin with no fix was installed, or a cleaned site has come back, and you want every layer removed in one pass rather than one at a time.